Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997 (1999)
This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does not matter in survival is easily undenuined. The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
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Citations of this work BETA
Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint.Robert Francescotti - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint.By Robert Francescotti - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21–31.
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