Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):33-39 (2007)
Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral reasons as pushes and pullsconsiderations whose job it is to get us to act or to stop us acting. Talk of default valency doesn't remove the puzzle, it merely restates it. We need a different picture of reasonsperhaps as providing a map of the moral terrain which helps us to see which actions are appropriate to which situations, and who the appropriate agents are. The role of virtue concepts in particular is more complex and varied than that of providing reasons for acting. A more holistic picture of reasons can make valency switching less mysterious. Key Words: default valency particularism reasons thick concepts valency switching virtues.
|Keywords||virtues particularism valency switching reasons default valency thick concepts|
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