Correctness and Cognitivism. Remarks on Robert Alexy's Argument from the Claim to Correctness

Ratio Juris 25 (1):15-30 (2012)
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Abstract

The argument from the claim to correctness has been put forward by Robert Alexy to defend the view that normative utterances admit of objective answers. My purpose in this paper is to preserve this initial aspiration even at the cost of diverting from some of the original ideas in support of the argument. I begin by spelling out a full-blooded version of normative cognitivism, against which I propose to reconstruct the argument from the claim to correctness. I argue that the context of uttering normative propositions points to the possibility of normative cognition, but does not constitute it. What constitutes the possibility of cognition is, as of necessity, the propositional structure of norms. I conclude that the argument from the claim to correctness ought to safeguard a distinction between the context of uttering a normative sentence and the proposition that individuates the content of the utterance

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George Pavlakos
University of Glasgow

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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Being for: evaluating the semantic program of expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Schroeder.
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.David M. Rasmussen - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (173):571.

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