Abstract

The emphasis in Part II is on the truth conditions of belief sentences. The chief aim is to show how the ontological account of belief advanced in Part I can serve as a basis for a theory of truth conditions for such sentences. The formal theory developed in Part II can, however, be discussed without reference to the earlier ontology. Chapter 11 presents the basic framework for the theory, and also deals with the truth conditions of the belief sentences which are construed as basic. In the later chapters the basic framework is extended to handle a variety of less simple cases, including belief sentences involving indexicals and quasi-indicators , proper names and definite descriptions , quantifying in , and "propositional quantification" . ;Chapters 2 - 6 contain background and motivation for Chapter 7, in which the central tenets of an alternative account of belief are presented. This account is an "adverbial" account in the broad sense of the term, but does not require the "adverbialization" of belief sentences. The account is developed further in Chapter 8, which deals with the truth and falsity of beliefs, and in Chapter 9, which deals with statements about shared beliefs. Chapter 10, which completes Part I, deals briefly with two further theories of belief which share some of the attractions of the account of Chapter 7. ;The emphasis in Part I is on ontological matters. Chapter 2 presents a framework in terms of which it is possible to discuss the identity conditions of belief situations without invoking any particular theory of belief. Chapter 3 describes the propositional view of belief, and draws out its implications concerning the identity conditions of belief situations in terms of the framework of Chapter 2. Chapters 4 and 5 contain a detailed discussion of the identity conditions of belief situations. It is argued in these chapters that the propositional view cannot do justice to the facts about these identity conditions. Chapter 6 deals with Perry's alternative to the propositional view. It is argued that Perry's theory fails to avoid all the difficulties of propositionalism, even though it is an improvement on it. ;This essay deals with the ontology of belief and the truth-conditional semantics of belief sentences. The chief aim of the essay is to develop a strong alternative to the view that propositions must be appealed to in an adequate philosophical treatment of belief and belief sentences