Logos and Episteme 5 (3):351-360 (2014)

Timothy Perrine
Wuhan University
In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.
Keywords Reflective Knowledge  Hilary Kornblith  Ernest Sosa  Introspection  Virtue Epistemology
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2014538
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References found in this work BETA

On Reflection.Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440.
Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):403-410.
Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue.Ernest Sosa - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):226-245.

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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.

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