Rigidification and attitudes

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):43-58 (2012)
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Abstract

Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism wrongly predicts that one cannot believe, say, that Joe Strummer was born in 1952 without having a belief about the actual world. Soames suggests that agents in other possible worlds may have this belief, but may lack any beliefs about the actual world, a world that they do not occupy and have no contact with. I respond that this argument extends to other popular actuality-involving analyses. In order for Soames to hold on to his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism, he must provide alternatives to these analyses. I argue that there is reason to think that these alternatives are not forthcoming, so Soames should surrender his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism

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Bryan Pickel
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

On What Actually Is.Fredrik Haraldsen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):643-656.

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References found in this work

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