Logics for modelling collective attitudes

Fundamenta Informaticae 158 (1-3):239-27 (2018)
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Abstract

We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained.

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Author's Profile

Daniele Porello
Università degli Studi di Genova

Citations of this work

Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic.Adrian Miroiu & Mircea Dumitru - 2022 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 32 (1):72-88.

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References found in this work

Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation.Edwin D. Mares - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
Substructural Logics: A Primer.Francesco Paoli - 2002 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.

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