Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110 (2002)

Authors
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that difficulty illustrates. Our paper describes this impossibility result and provides an exploration of its significance. The result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem (Arrow, 1963 and 1984; Sen, 1970) and we elaborate that comparison in a companion paper (List and Pettit, 2002). The paper is in four sections. The first section documents the need for various groups to aggregate its members' judgments; the second presents the discursive paradox; the third gives an informal statement of the more general impossibility result; the formal proof is presented in an appendix. The fourth section, finally, discusses some escape routes from that impossibility.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Social choice theory  Propositional logic  Doctrinal paradox  Discursive dilemma  Arrow's theorem
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References found in this work BETA

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
The Law of Group Polarization.Cass R. Sunstein - 2002 - Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2):175–195.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.

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Citations of this work BETA

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.

View all 190 citations / Add more citations

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Which Worlds Are Possible? A Judgment Aggregation Problem.Christian List - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):57 - 65.
A Solution to the Discursive Dilemma.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):181 - 188.
Rational Aggregation.Bruce Chapman - 2002 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):337-354.

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