David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110 (2002)
Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that difficulty illustrates. Our paper describes this impossibility result and provides an exploration of its significance. The result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem (Arrow, 1963 and 1984; Sen, 1970) and we elaborate that comparison in a companion paper (List and Pettit, 2002). The paper is in four sections. The first section documents the need for various groups to aggregate its members' judgments; the second presents the discursive paradox; the third gives an informal statement of the more general impossibility result; the formal proof is presented in an appendix. The fourth section, finally, discusses some escape routes from that impossibility.
|Keywords||Judgment aggregation Social choice theory Propositional logic Doctrinal paradox Discursive dilemma Arrow's theorem|
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Citations of this work BETA
Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
Philip Pettit (2001). Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma. Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.
Pauly Marc & Hees Martin Van (2006). Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.
Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Interdisciplinary Groups. Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
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