On the Notion of Sense in Phenomenology: Noematic Sense and Ideal Meaning

Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):184-204 (2016)
Dominique Pradelle
Université Paris Sorbonne
_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 184 - 204 According to a very specific and widespread line of interpretation, the mode of working of intentionality could be understood by analogy with the linguistic paradigm set forth by Gottlob Frege in his famous essay “_Über Sinn und Bedeutung._” The goal of the present paper is to dismiss such an interpretation by also analyzing the manner in which Husserl relates, and thereby traces back, the constitution of the logical sphere to the so-called pre-categorial.
Keywords Frege   intentionality   noema   sense   Husserl
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DOI 10.1163/15691640-12341335
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