Uncertainty and undermining

Abstract

Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.

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James Pryor
New York University

Citations of this work

What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
In defence of dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
An Internalist Externalism.William P. Alston - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The General Theory of Employment.John Maynard Keynes - 1937 - Quarterly Journal of Economics 51:209-223.

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