About this topic
Summary Defeat in epistemology focuses on the idea that one's justification or evidence or reasons for believing, and thus one's knowledge, may be defeated in some way by "defeaters." Views diverge over what defeaters are (whether they are mental states, or propositions, or facts, or some combination thereof). Views also diverge over how defeat works (e.g. whether they are what Pollock called "undercutting" or "rebutting," or whether defeaters attack one's reasons, one's evidence, or simply whether one knows or is justified in believing).  The debate over defeat extends to issues surrounding the rationality of belief that p in the face of higher-order belief or evidence concerning whether one's belief (or credence) in p is reliable or rational; to the conditions, if any, under which one may be dogmatic toward information one regards as misleading; and to formal epistemology's interest in capturing how one's credence ought to change given incoming evidence.
Key works The contemporary discussion originates with Chisholm 1966 and Pollock 1986 (Ch. 3) / Pollock 1987; for "defeasibility" theories of knowledge, see Klein 1976. For discussion of defeaters as mental states, see Bergmann 2005 and Bergmann 2006, Ch. 6. For a "normative defeaters" view on which defeaters may be propositions one ought to believe, see Goldberg 2016, Goldberg 2017, and Benton 2016. For two ways of characterizing defeat, see Kvanvig 2007. For discussion of higher-order evidence and its bearing on rational belief, see Horowitz 2014Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, and Schoenfield 2015; for related matters in the epistemology of disagreement, see Christensen & Lackey 2013. For work casting doubt on the viability of knowledge defeat, see Lasonen-Aarnio 2010 and Baker-Hytch & Benton 2015
Introductions Grundmann 2011
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  1. added 2020-05-07
    The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham & Jack C. Lyons - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeaters. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-17
    Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
    In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D—the (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-09
    Circular and Question-Begging Responses to Religious Disagreement and Debunking Arguments.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Disagreement and debunking arguments threaten religious belief. In this paper, I draw attention to two types of propositions and show how they reveal new ways to respond to debunking arguments and disagreement. The first type of proposition is the epistemically self-promoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield an epistemically circular argument in response to (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-23
    The Limits of Rational Belief Revision: A Dilemma for the Darwinian Debunker.Katia Vavova - forthcoming - Noûs.
    We are fallible creatures, prone to making all sorts of mistakes. So, we should be open to evidence of error. But what constitutes such evidence? And what is it to rationally accommodate it? I approach these questions by considering an evolutionary debunking argument according to which (a) we have good, scientific, reason to think our moral beliefs are mistaken, and (b) rationally accommodating this requires revising our confidence in, or altogether abandoning the suspect beliefs. I present a dilemma for such (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-23
    Being Rational and Being Right.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
  6. added 2020-02-12
    Knowledge, Perception, and Memory.Don Locke - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):279-280.
  7. added 2020-01-28
    Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-25
    Appearance and Explanation: A Defense of Phenomenal Explanationism (Monograph, in Progress).Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity it faces numerous objections and challenges. In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (Springer, 2020), Moretti suggests that integrating PC with a theory of reflective/inferential justification would have the potential to shield PC from various challenges. Moretti also suggests that this sort of integration is worth exploring because it may allow PC to provide a more forceful response to skepticism and better account for ordinary cognitive practices. (...)
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  9. added 2019-12-05
    Losing Knowledge by Thinking About Thinking.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification and Defeat. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Defeat cases are often taken to show that even the most securely-based judgment can be rationally undermined by misleading evidence. Starting with some best-case scenario for perceptual knowledge, for example, it is possible to undermine the subject’s confidence in her sensory faculties until it becomes unreasonable for her to persist in her belief. Some have taken such cases to indicate that any basis for knowledge is rationally defeasible; others have argued that there can be unreasonable knowledge. I argue that defeat (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-05
    Jessica Brown: Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):637-644.
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  11. added 2019-11-10
    Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - forthcoming - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Abstract. This paper argues that the “Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement” fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism. The main reason for this is that the argument rests on a too strong assumption about the normative significance of peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally). In order to demonstrate this, I distinguish two competing ways in which one might explain higher-order defeat. According to what I call the “Objective Defeat Explanation” it is the mere possession of higher-order evidence (...)
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  12. added 2019-11-03
    Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat, and All the Evidence.Silvan Wittwer - forthcoming - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY, USA:
    Recently, Tomas Bogardus (2016), Andreas Mogensen (2017) and – at least on one plausible reconstruction – Sharon Street (2005) have argued that evolutionary theory debunks our moral beliefs by providing higher-order evidence of error. In response, moral realists such as Katia Vavova (2014) have objected that such evolutionary debunking arguments are self-defeating. The literature lacks any discussion of whether this self-defeat objection can be handled. My overall aim is to argue that it cannot, thus filling that lacuna – and vindicating (...)
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  13. added 2019-10-15
    Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - In Jessica and Simion Brown (ed.), Reasons, Justification and Defeat. Oxford, UK:
    Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticisable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticisable for retaining beliefs in the face (...)
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  14. added 2019-10-05
    Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
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  15. added 2019-10-05
    Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 117-135.
    On an optimistic version of realist moral epistemology, a significant range of ordinary moral beliefs, construed in realist terms, constitute knowledge—or at least some weaker positive epistemic status, such as epistemic justification. The “debunking challenge” to this view grants prima facie justification but claims that it is “debunked” (i.e., defeated), yielding the final verdict that moral beliefs are ultima facie unjustified. Notable candidate “debunkers” (i.e., defeaters) include the so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments,” the “Benacerraf-Field Challenge,” and persistent moral disagreement among epistemic (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-24
    The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called Entitlement, a (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-18
    Knowing Our Limits.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/- Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how (...)
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  18. added 2019-09-17
    Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’.B. J. C. Madison - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-17
    Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and (...)
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  20. added 2019-09-13
    The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  21. added 2019-09-06
    Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
  22. added 2019-08-29
    Objectivist Conditions for Defeat and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):246-259.
    I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of (...)
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  23. added 2019-07-25
    Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.
    Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of (...)
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  24. added 2019-07-19
    Modal Security.Justin Clarke‐Doane & Dan Baras - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Modal Security is an increasingly discussed proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat. Modal Security says, roughly, that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) one’s belief, then one gets reason to doubt the belief's safety or sensitivity. The primary interest of the principle is that it seems to entail that influential epistemological arguments, including Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against moral realism and the Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism, are unsound. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Modal Security in detail. (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.
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  26. added 2019-04-12
    Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.
    People may disagree about moral issues because they have fundamentally different intuitions. I argue that we ought to suspend judgement in such cases. Since we trust our own moral intuitions without positive evidence of their reliability, we must necessarily extend this trust to the moral intuitions of others: a fundamental self-other asymmetry in moral epistemology is untenable. This ensures that disagreements in moral intuition are defeating. In addition, I argue that brute conflicts in moral intuition require suspension of judgement only (...)
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  27. added 2019-04-12
    Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases of contingency anxiety involve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting this Disagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant in determining whether (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-31
    Debunking Arguments and Metaphysical Laws.Jonathan Barker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1829-1855.
    I argue that one’s views about which “metaphysical laws” obtain—including laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what, and about what grounds what—can be used to deflect or neutralize the threat posed by a debunking explanation. I use a well-known debunking argument in the metaphysics of material objects as a case study. Then, after defending the proposed strategy from the charge of question-begging, I close by showing how the proposed strategy can be used by certain (...)
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  29. added 2019-02-18
    The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.
    According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source: Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that (...)
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  30. added 2019-01-25
    Liars, Tigers, and Bearers of Bad News, Oh My!: Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat.Emelia Miller - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):82-99.
    The standard reliabilist line on defeat is open to counterexamples regarding its necessity and sufficiency. In this paper, I present three problems for the standard reliabilist line from the recent literature on defeat before arguing that reliabilists can solve those problems by adopting an account of justification that ties defeat to the evidence possessed by the relevant agent. In doing so, I show that there is a conception of having evidence that reliabilists can adopt without giving up on the core (...)
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  31. added 2018-11-29
    Hume, Defeat, and Miracle Reports.Charity Anderson - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-28.
    This chapter investigates the rationality of failing to believe miracle reports. Hume famously argued that it is irrational to believe that a miracle has occurred on the basis of testimony alone. While certain aspects of Hume's argument have received extensive discussion, other features of his argument have been largely overlooked. After offering a reconstruction of Hume's argument, I argue that epistemic defeat plays a central role in the argument, and I explore the aptness of as well as some limitations to (...)
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  32. added 2018-10-08
    Higher-Order Defeat and Intellectual Responsibility.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been (...)
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  33. added 2018-10-01
    The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.
    Some philosophers have defended the idea that in cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence it is rational to take divergent doxastic attitudes to p and E supports p. In a recent paper, Sophie Horowitz has argued that such “Level-Splitting views” are implausible since they violate a rational requirement she calls the Non-Akrasia Constraint. In this paper, I argue that Horowitz’s objection is misguided since it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality.
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  34. added 2018-08-22
    Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.
    Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to (...)
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  35. added 2018-08-15
    Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, it has proved puzzling how higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order defeat seems to defy being understood in terms of conditionalization; and higher-order defeat can sometimes place agents in what seem like epistemic (...)
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  36. added 2018-03-19
    Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.
    It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. (...)
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  37. added 2018-02-17
    Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
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  38. added 2018-01-10
    The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification: Conscious Experience, Higher-Order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Switzerland: Springer.
    This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book’s discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities (...)
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  39. added 2018-01-06
    Undefeated Naturalism.Glenn Ross - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (2):159-184.
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  40. added 2018-01-06
    Against Epistemic Indolence.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Mind 92 (367):424-429.
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  41. added 2017-12-14
    How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.
    Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher-level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no-defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from (...)
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  42. added 2017-11-09
    Testimony Amidst Diversity.Max Baker-Hytch - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-202.
  43. added 2017-10-06
    Disagreement and Defeat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism.
    The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease your confidence that you are in the right. Since peer disagreement seems to be quite prevalent, the equal weight view seems to tell us that we cannot reasonably believe many of the interesting things we believe because we can always count on a peer to contest the interesting things that we believe. While the equal weight view seems to have skeptical implications, few (...)
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  44. added 2017-08-23
    Defeaters in Current Epistemology: Introduction to the Special Issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.
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  45. added 2017-07-12
    Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):80-98.
    In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.
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  46. added 2017-05-30
    Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
    Dorr et al. present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.
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  47. added 2017-03-16
    Defeater Goes External.Mikael Janvid - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):701-715.
    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour’s reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they (...)
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  48. added 2017-03-10
    The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...)
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  49. added 2017-02-12
    Self-Refutation and Self-Defeat.Jim Slagle - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (222):157-164.
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  50. added 2017-02-11
    Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.
    Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between knowledge and truth. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it (...)
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