David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In this short paper, I compare and contrast the kind of symmetric treatment of negation favoured in different ways by Huw Price (in “Why ‘Not’?”) and by me (in “Multiple Conclusions”) with Robert Brandom’s analysis of scorekeeping in terms of commitment, entitlement and incompatibility. Both kinds of account are what Brandom calls a normative pragmatics. They are both semantic anti-realist accounts of meaning in the significance of vocabulary is explained in terms of our rule-governed (normative) practice (pragmatics). These accounts differ from intuitionist semantic anti-realism by providing a way to distinguish the inferential significance of “A” and “A is warranted.” Although proof plays a central role, in neither accont is verification the primary bearer of meaning. Our accounts make these distinctions in terms of a subtle analysis of our practices. On the one hand according to Price and me, we assert as well as deny; on the other, Brandom distingushes downstream commitments from upstream entitlements and the notion of incompatibility definable in terms of these. In this paper I will examine a number connections between these different approaches, and end with a discussion of the kind of account of proof that might emerge from these considerations.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Edgar Andrade-Lotero & Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2012). A Contentious Trinity: Levels of Entailment in Brandom's Pragmatist Inferentialism. Philosophia 40 (1):41-53.
Benedikt Paul Göcke, Martin Pleitz & Hanno von Wulfen (2008). How to Kripke Brandom's Notion of Necessity. In Bernd Prien & David P. Schweikard (eds.), Robert Brandom. Analytic Pragmatist. ontos.
Matthias Kiesselbach (2012). Constructing Commitment: Brandom's Pragmatist Take on Rule-Following. Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Daniel Whiting (2006). Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom's Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (3):3-22.
Daniele Porello (2012). Incompatibility Semantics From Agreement. Philosophia 40 (1):99-119.
Greg Restall (2005). Multiple Conclusions. In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
John MacFarlane (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.
Mark Lance (2001). The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment III Brandomian Scorekeeping and Incompatibility. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):439-464.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #99,449 of 1,925,480 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #418,235 of 1,925,480 )
How can I increase my downloads?