Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569 (2006)
Abstract
Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter as a result of being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call “Folieism”). In his Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, “On Rey’s view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses.” I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his “empiricist” alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn’t explain the conventionality of language and success of communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity of intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt’s objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account of the role of linguistic intuitions than the “empirical” account on which he insists
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI croatjphil2006639
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,182
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Linguistic Intuitions.Jeffrey Maynes & Steven Gross - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):714-730.
What "Intuitions" Are Linguistic Evidence?Michael Devitt - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):251 - 264.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
What Remains of Our Knowledge of Language?Barry C. Smith - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):557-75.
Intuitions.Nenad Miščević - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.
In Defense of Folieism.Georges Rey - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
Intuitions in Linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
Ignorance Radicalized.Gergo Somodi - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):140-156.
What "Intuitions" Are Linguistic Evidence?Michael Devitt - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):251 - 264.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-08-17

Total downloads

50 ( #104,996 of 2,172,038 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #172,864 of 2,172,038 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums