Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569 (2006)

Authors
Georges Rey
University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter as a result of being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call “Folieism”). In his Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, “On Rey’s view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses.” I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his “empiricist” alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn’t explain the conventionality of language and success of communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity of intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt’s objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account of the role of linguistic intuitions than the “empirical” account on which he insists
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI croatjphil2006639
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,842
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Whither Experimental Semantics?Michael Devitt - 2012 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 27 (1):5-36.
The Ontology of Words: A Structural Approach.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):877-911.
Linguistic Intuitions.Jeffrey Maynes & Steven Gross - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):714-730.
Linguistic Intuitions Revisited.Michael Devitt - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):833-865.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Remains of Our Knowledge of Language? Reply to Collins.Barry C. Smith - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):557-75.
Ignorance Radicalized.Gergo Somodi - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):140-156.
Intuitions in Linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
In Defense of Folieism.Georges Rey - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
Intuitions.Nenad Miščević - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-08-17

Total views
65 ( #160,195 of 2,438,931 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #434,842 of 2,438,931 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes