Philosophia 39 (2):345-355 (2011)

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Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge
Keywords Latent belief, dispositional belief, propositional ignorance  factive ignorance, true belief, knowledge  excuse
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9301-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Significance of #MeToo.Karyn L. Freedman - 2020 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (2).
A Logic for Factive Ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - forthcoming - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.
Truth and Ignorance.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-24.
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.

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