Synthese 192 (2):431-452 (2015)
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Abstract |
Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that these findings do not threaten philosophical expertise—though we can draw lessons for more effective empirical tests
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Keywords | Expertise defense Methodology Moral intuition Philosophical intuition |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11229-014-0579-y |
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References found in this work BETA
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect.Philippa Foot - 1967 - Oxford Review 5:5-15.
View all 72 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141:127-137.
Philosophical Expertise Under the Microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.
Religious Disagreement: An Empirical Study Among Academic Philosophers.Helen De Cruz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1).
View all 16 citations / Add more citations
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2014-11-19
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