Moral Judgment, Misc

Edited by Leonard Kahn (Loyola University, New Orleans)
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  1. added 2020-06-02
    Z Bauman, Le sfide dell'etica. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1998 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 90 (1\2):318.
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  2. added 2020-05-18
    Autonome Vernunft Oder Moralische Sehkraft. Das Epistemische Fundament der Ethik Bei Immanuel Kant Und Iris Murdoch.Andreas Trampota - 2003 - Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
    Das Buch ist ein Beitrag zur aktuellen philosophischen Debatte über das anthropologisch-epistemologische Fundament moralischer Normen. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche Modelle vorgestellt: zum einen die Autonomie-Konzeption Kants, die auf dem Begriff des freien Willens gründet, der sich selbst dem Vernunftgesetz unterstellt; zum anderen die von Platon inspirierte Moralphilosophie Iris Murdochs, in der die moralische Sehkraft, die sich an der aufmerksamen Wahrnehmung des konkreten Einzelnen orientiert, im Mittelpunkt des guten Lebens steht. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den beiden Entwürfen werden deren Stärken und (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-04
    Thickness and Evaluation.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):89-104.
    This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-22
    Book Review: Be Good and Do Good: Thinking Through Moral Theology. By Bernard V. Brady. [REVIEW]David Kirchhoffer - 2015 - Theological Studies 76 (4):895-895.
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  5. added 2020-04-17
    Ren: An Exemplary Life.Karyn L. Lai - 2014 - In Amy Olberding (ed.), Dao Companion to the Analects. Springer. pp. 83-94.
    This chapter discusses ren 仁, a major term in the Confucian Analects. It analyzes the range of meanings of ren across different conversations, paying special attention to its associations with other key Confucian terms such as li (禮 behavioural propriety) and zhi (知 understanding). Building on this analysis, the discussion focuses on ren in terms of how it is manifest in a person’s life. In particular, it expresses ren in terms of an exemplary life—a life lived well. The chapter also (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-16
    Clean Hands: Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity.Jesse S. Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Oup Usa.
    People with Scrupulosity have rigorous, obsessive moral beliefs that lead to extreme and compulsive moral acts. These fascinating outliers raise profound questions about human nature, mental illness, moral belief, responsibility, and psychiatric treatment. Clean Hands? Uses a range of case studies to examine this condition and its philosophical implications.
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  7. added 2020-04-02
    L.W. Sumner’s Account of Welfare.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2001 - In Juan José Acero, Francesc Camós Abril & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández (eds.), Actas del III Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica, Granada.
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  8. added 2020-03-12
    Review of Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    Philosophical lessons come in many different shapes and sizes. Some lessons are big, some are small. Some lessons go deep and have a big impact, some are shallow and have almost none. Some lessons are not really philosophical at all or would not really be lessons for an audience of academic philosophers. I mention these truisms not to disparage this informative book on 'moral OCD' (moral obsessive-compulsive disorder, or 'Scrupulosity') but rather to emphasize how difficult it can be to discern (...)
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  9. added 2020-03-10
    Naturalism and Normative Cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Normative cognition seems rather important, even ineliminable. Communities that lack normative concepts like SHOULD, IS A REASON TO, JUSTIFIES, etc. seem cognitively handicapped and communicatively muzzled. And yet a popular metaethic, normative naturalism, has a hard time accommodating this felt ineliminability. Here, I press the argument against normative naturalism, consider some replies on behalf of normative naturalists, and suggest that a version of sophisticated subjectivism does the best job preserving the importance and ineliminability of the special, normative way of thinking.
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  10. added 2020-02-23
    Metaethical Intentionalism and the Intersubjectivity of Morals.Kyle Ferguson - 2020 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, City University of New York
    I defend a thesis called metaethical intentionalism, according to which deontic moral judgments (“ought” judgments) are intersubjective intentions or verbal expressions of intersubjective intentions. They have the form, “We shall any of us do A in C,” or are derivable from such practical commitments. They are universalizable by virtue of their content (“… any of us …”) and sharable by virtue of their form (“We …”). My account of the moral “ought” is inspired by the moral writings of Wilfrid Sellars (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-20
    Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model?Necip Fikri Alican - 2020 - Dialogue and Universalism 30 (1):171–190.
    This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same op-position. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-13
    Decision Conflict Drives Reaction Times and Utilitarian Responses in Sacrificial Dilemmas.Alejandro Rosas, Juan Pablo Bermúdez & David Aguilar-Pardo - 2019 - Judgment and Decision Making 14:555-564.
    In the sacrificial moral dilemma task, participants have to morally judge an action that saves several lives at the cost of killing one person. According to the dual process corrective model of moral judgment suggested by Greene and collaborators (2001; 2004; 2008), cognitive control is necessary to override the intuitive, deontological force of the norm against killing and endorse the utilitarian perspective. However, a conflict model has been proposed more recently to account for part of the evidence in favor of (...)
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  13. added 2019-11-14
    Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress.Agnes Tam - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (1):73-96.
    A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reasoning merely rationalizes pre-existing biased moral norms. In (...)
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  14. added 2019-11-03
    Intellectual Isolation.Jeremy David Fix - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):491-520.
    Intellectualism is the widespread view that practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, distinguished from others by its objects: reasons to act. I argue that if practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, practical judgments by nature have nothing to do with action. If they have nothing to do with action, I cannot act from my representation of reasons for me to act. If I cannot act from those representations, those reasons cannot exist. If they cannot exist, neither (...)
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  15. added 2019-10-24
    Why Moral Heuristics Can Lead to Mistaken Moral Judgments.Vitaliy Nadurak - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):99-113.
    Given the lack of generally accepted moral standards, one of the controversial questions for those who investigate moral heuristics is whether we can argue that moral heuristics can lead to mistaken moral judgments. This paper suggests that, even if we agree that moral standards are different and chosen subjectively, deviations from them are possible and we can prove such deviations in a logically correct way. However, in this case, it must be admitted that not every deviation is a mistake. Deviation (...)
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  16. added 2019-10-17
    Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap).Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-14.
    Robotization is an increasingly pervasive feature of our lives. Robots with high degrees of autonomy may cause harm, yet in sufciently complex systems neither the robots nor the human developers may be candidates for moral blame. John Danaher has recently argued that this may lead to a retribution gap, where the human desire for retribution faces a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame. The potential social and moral implications of a retribution gap are considerable. I argue that the retributive (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-30
    Che Fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull’azione.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - Roma: Carocci.
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  18. added 2019-09-19
    Do the Right Thing.Elinor Mason - 2017 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7. pp. 117-135.
    Subjective rightness (or ‘ought’ or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-12
    Indignation, Practical Rationality and Our Moral Life: A Grammatical Investigation.Jônadas Techio - 2016 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 15 (2):260-278.
    This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement, as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; (...)
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  20. added 2019-08-19
    Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (2):1-23.
    Moral philosophy continues to be enriched by an ongoing empirical turn,mainly through contributions from neuroscience, biology, and psychology. Thusfar, cultural anthropology has largely been missing. A recent and rapidly growing‘ethical turn’ within cultural anthropologynow explicitly and systematically studiesmorality. This research report aims to introduce to an audience in moral philosophyseveral notable works within the ethical turn. It does so by critically discussing theethical turn’s contributions to four topics: the definition of morality, the nature ofmoral change and progress, the truth of (...)
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  21. added 2019-07-12
    Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):583-601.
    The most basic argument for moral relativism is that different people are disposed to apply moral terms, such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’, and the corresponding concepts, to different acts. In this paper, I argue that the standard forms of moral relativism fail to account for certain instances of fundamental variation, namely, variation in metaethical intuitions, and I develop a form of relativism—pluralism—that does account for them. I identify two challenges that pluralism faces. To answer the challenges, I first (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-17
    Ethical Issues in Limb Transplants.Donna Dickenson & Guy Widdershoven - 2001 - Bioethics 15 (2):110–124.
    On one view, limb transplants cross technological frontiers but not ethical ones; the only issues to be resolved concern professional competence, under the assumption of patient autonomy. Given that the benefits of limb transplant do not outweigh the risks, however, the autonomy and rationality of the patient are not necessarily self‐evident. In addition to questions of resource allocation and informed consent, limb, and particularly hand, allograft also raises important issues of personal identity and bodily integrity. We present two linked schemas (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-11
    Resisting Reductive Realism.N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford University Press.
    Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    Leges Sine Moribus Vanae: Does Language Make Moral Thinking Possible?Matteo Colombo - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):501-521.
    Does language make moral cognition possible? Some authors like Andy Clark have argued for a positive answer whereby language and the ways people use it mark a fundamental divide between humans and all other animals with respect to moral thinking (Clark, Mind and morals: essays on cognitive science and ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000a; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000b; Philosophy of mental representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    On Katherine Dimitriou’s “Drowning Man”.Joseph Ulatowski - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):25-28.
    Ms. Dimitriou's motivist view has a simple upshot: for at least some cases, our moral assessment of an action should depend on the motives behind it (Dimitriou, passim). This may be contrasted with the antimotivist position, the view that argues motives should not figure into our moral assessment of an action. She presents two provocative cases where an agent’s motive “infects” the concomitant action. One example involves racist thinking and the other a form of sexual self-gratification. Given that we would (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Beyond Moral Judgment, by Alice Crary.Miranda Fricker - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):311-315.
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Practical Reasoning and Moral Judgment.Joseph M. Boyle - 1984 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 58:37.
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    The Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]James Mackey - 1968 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17:287-288.
    This first book by Patrick McGrath should be very well received by all who take an interest in philosophizing at the present time, whether that interest be of the more professional academic, or of the more general type. Moral philosophy lends itself to general interest more easily than almost any other branch of philosophy. ‘Moral judgments’, as the introduction points out,‘form a constant feature of everyday discourse—“Euthanasia is never morally justified”, “Hitler was an evil man”, “You ought to apologize for (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    The Genesis of the Moral Judgment in Plato.Rupert Clendon Lodge - 1922 - International Journal of Ethics 33 (1):34-54.
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  30. added 2019-06-05
    Marino, Patricia. Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World.Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2015. Pp. 216. $27.95. [REVIEW]Uri D. Leibowitz - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):792-797.
  31. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsAlice Crary,. Beyond Moral Judgment.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. 256. $39.95.Eugene Garver - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):338-340.
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  32. added 2019-06-05
    Moral Judgment. D. Daiches Raphael.Paul W. Kurtz - 1956 - Ethics 66 (4):292-294.
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  33. added 2019-05-01
    The Universalizability of Moral Judgements.Peter Winch - 1965 - The Monist 49 (2):196-214.
    Sidgwick's theses that "if I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in certain important respects" fails to differentiate moral judgments of importantly different kinds and, In particular, Overlooks peculiarities of a kind of judgment, Made by a prospective agent, About what "he" ought to do. The court-Martial in melville's "billy budd" is closely examined as an example. Although (...)
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  34. added 2019-04-27
    Measuring Moral Reasoning Using Moral Dilemmas: Evaluating Reliability, Validity, and Differential Item Functioning of the Behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT).Youn-Jeng Choi, Hyemin Han, Kelsie J. Dawson, Stephen J. Thoma & Andrea L. Glenn - 2019 - European Journal of Developmental Psychology 16 (5):622-631.
    We evaluated the reliability, validity, and differential item functioning (DIF) of a shorter version of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1), the behavioral DIT (bDIT), measuring the development of moral reasoning. 353 college students (81 males, 271 females, 1 not reported; age M = 18.64 years, SD = 1.20 years) who were taking introductory psychology classes at a public University in a suburb area in the Southern United States participated in the present study. First, we examined the reliability of the bDIT (...)
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  35. added 2019-04-12
    How Ecumenical Expressivism Confuses the Trivial and the Substantive.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):666-674.
    I argue that there are cases in which ecumenical expressivism cannot distinguish between endorsement of certain trivial and substantive normative judgments. I consider the extent to which this problem generalizes across different formulations of the ecumenical view. I suggest that we may not be able to escape the problem if we hope to retain the ability to solve the Frege-Geach problem in the way promised by ecumenical expressivism.
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  36. added 2019-03-14
    Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. -/- This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a (...)
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  37. added 2019-03-13
    Moral Judgments as Descriptions of Institutional Facts.Rafael Ferber - 1994 - In Georg Meggle & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Analyomen 1, Proceedings of the 1st Conference ”Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 719-729.
    Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...)
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  38. added 2019-03-10
    Optimality Bias in Moral Judgment.Julian De Freitas & Samuel G. B. Johnson - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 79:149-163.
    We often make decisions with incomplete knowledge of their consequences. Might people nonetheless expect others to make optimal choices, despite this ignorance? Here, we show that people are sensitive to moral optimality: that people hold moral agents accountable depending on whether they make optimal choices, even when there is no way that the agent could know which choice was optimal. This result held up whether the outcome was positive, negative, inevitable, or unknown, and across within-subjects and between-subjects designs. Participants consistently (...)
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  39. added 2019-02-26
    Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    This 183-page introductory part of my dissertation is an overview of some key debates in philosophical moral psychology and its methodology.
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  40. added 2019-01-10
    The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology.Marcus Arvan - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):87-115.
    This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well-supported theories all predict that this ‘Discovery Model’ of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative ‘Negotiation Model’ of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating (...)
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  41. added 2018-12-31
    The Consistency of Medical Conscience Clause in the Light of the Abortion Debate.Krzysztof Jaworski - 2016 - Diametros 47:84-97.
    The article describes the problem of the consistency of the medical conscience clause in the Polish legal system. In the first part of the paper, I outline an account of conscience as the ultimate norm of morality. In its second part, I discuss the meaning of conscience clause and its legal status. Part three examines some criticisms of the clause in its present form. The main criticism is that the clause is self-referential, which in some cases leads to absurdity.
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  42. added 2018-12-31
    Narrative, Casuistry, and the Function of Conscience in Thomas Aquinas.Stephen Chanderbhan - 2016 - Diametros 47:1-18.
    Both the function of one’s conscience, as Thomas Aquinas understands it, and the work of casuistry in general involve deliberating about which universal moral principles are applicable in particular cases. Thus, understanding how conscience can function better also indicates how casuistry might be done better – both on Thomistic terms, at least. I claim that, given Aquinas’ descriptions of certain parts of prudence and the role of moral virtue in practical knowledge, understanding particular cases more as narratives, or parts of (...)
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  43. added 2018-12-31
    A Thomistic Argument for Respecting Conscientious Refusals.Michał Głowala - 2016 - Diametros 47:19-34.
    The paper presents an argument for respecting conscientious refusals based on the Thomistic account of conscience; the argument does not employ the notion of right. The main idea is that acting against one’s conscience necessarily makes the action objectively wrong and performed in bad faith, and expecting someone to act against his or her conscience is incompatible with requiring him or her to act in good faith. In light of this idea I also examine the issue of obligations imposed on (...)
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  44. added 2018-12-31
    Complicating Conscience, Refreshing Discontent.Paul J. Medeiros - 2016 - Diametros 47:50-63.
    The 19th Century New England author Thoreau provides an approach to conscience and unjust laws approximating that given by St. Thomas Aquinas in _Summa Theologiae_. But the portrait of conscience given by Thoreau in the 1848 oration “Civil Disobedience” is incomplete. Thoreau’s approach is solved by accepting insights given in Part I and Part I–II of _Summa Theologiae_. Allowing St. Thomas’ insights requires reform of Thoreau’s civil disobedience and conscientious objection. But Thoreau’s arguments are given new life.
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  45. added 2018-12-24
    Moral Principles Don't Signify.Paul E. Mullen - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):19-21.
    DAVID WARD, in his interesting essay, advances a number of propositions: -/- That moral (including evil) behavior must be governed by a principle. That the principles involved in evil actions are unconscious. That these unconscious evil principles may be the product of malignant narcissism. And somewhat tentatively, that evil is driven "independent of any conscious desires" and by implication the evil person may be stripped of moral responsibility for their behavior. -/- To begin with common ground: Those who act in (...)
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  46. added 2018-11-12
    No Luck for Moral Luck.Markus Kneer & Edouard Machery - 2019 - Cognition 182:331-348.
    Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...)
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  47. added 2018-11-01
    Reasons Probably Won’T Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions.Matthew L. Stanley, Ashley M. Dougherty, Brenda W. Yang, Paul Henne & Felipe De Brigard - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (7):962-987.
    Although many philosophers argue that making and revising moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons informs people’s moral decisions and prompts them to change their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants examined reasons for only the option initially chosen(affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both options. Although participants were more likely to (...)
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  48. added 2018-11-01
    Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality?Paul Henne & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
  49. added 2018-10-11
    Crime, Punishment, and Causation.Philip Robbins & Paul Litton - 2018 - Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 24 (1):118-127.
    Moral judgments about a situation are profoundly shaped by the perception of individuals in that situation as either moral agents or moral patients (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), Specifically, the more we see someone as a moral agent, the less we see them as a moral patient, and vice versa. As a result, casting the perpetrator of a transgression as a victim tends to have the effect of making them seem less blameworthy (Gray & Wegner, 2011). (...)
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  50. added 2018-10-05
    La paille et la poutre: notes sur l'éthique de la condamnation morale.Daniel Schulthess - 1993 - Studia Philosophica 52:173-182.
    We often have judgments of moral condemnation on our fellow men. When we take seriously our individual and collective experience of moral judgment, we realize, however, that, in order to be properly brought to bear, judgments of moral condemnation must satisfy certain standards that are most often implicit. These norms form what we will call an "ethics of moral condemnation". Once unveiled, these standards surprise us with their rigor.
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