Abstract

The author argues that Fuller’s book, with the single exception of its correct reinterpretation of Kuhn as no apostle of postmodernism—such that his “fans” and “foes” alike are boxing with (or cheering on) only a shadow Kuhn—is worse than worthless. For, in a disreputable and outright propagandistic fashion, it consists in a series of serious distortions of and outright falsehoods about Kuhn and recent philosophy of science, distortions and falsehoods which may well mislead the unwary reader. Nickles’ s collection by contrast is a competent, useful, and workmanlike performance, although the author argues that the editor’s focus on cognitive science uses of Kuhn (and of Wittgenstein) is unhelpful, in that these uses again distort the philosophy of Kuhn (as of Wittgenstein), who was on balance no apostle of cognitive science either