A Note on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief

In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 235-252 (2011)
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Nathan Salmón
University of California at Santa Barbara

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The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.

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