Philosophia (2):1-23 (2020)

Authors
Alessio Santelli
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila
Abstract
According to an influential line of thought, from the assumption that indeterminism makes future contingents neither true nor false, one can conclude that assertions of future contingents are never permissible. This conclusion, however, fails to recognize that we ordinarily assert future contingents even when we take the future to be unsettled. Several attempts have been made to solve this puzzle, either by arguing that, albeit truth-valueless, future contingents can be correctly assertable, or by rejecting the claim that future contingents are truth-valueless. The paper examines three of most representative accounts in line with the first attempt, and concludes that none of them succeed in providing a persuasive answer as to why we felicitously assert future contingents.
Keywords Future Contingents  Open Future  Assertion
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Reprint years 2020
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-020-00235-0
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Deciding to Believe.Bernard Williams - 1970 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.

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