Evidence= Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism?

In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A single argument template---the EPH template---can be used to generate versions of the best known and most challenging skeptical problems. In his brilliantly groundbreaking book Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson presents a theory of knowledge and evidence which he clearly intends to provide a response to skepticism in its most important forms. After laying out EPH skepticism and reviewing possible ways of responding to it, I show how elements of Williamson’s theory motivate a hitherto unexplored way of responding to EPH-generated skeptical arguments. Then I offer reasons to doubt the correctness of Williamson’s response

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidence= Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism?Stephen Schiffer - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202.
Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism.John M. DePoe - 2008 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 30:23-32.
Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16.
Skepticism, naturalism, pyrrhonism.Otávio Bueno - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):148-163.
Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Interpretation and knowledge maximization.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405.
Why Williamson should be a sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
85 (#67,315)

6 months
85 (#193,466)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references