In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press (2016)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues that we do not act intentionally ‘under the guise of the good.’ This makes it hard to explain why akrasia is distinctively irrational; but this is no objection, since it is just as hard to explain on the opposing view. Ends with a problem of akrasia for ethical rationalists.
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Constitutivism Without Normative Thresholds.Kathryn Lindeman - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (XII):231-258.
Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.

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