Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

Oxford University Press (2016)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.
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ISBN(s) 9780190462925   0190462922
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.

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