Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

New York, New York: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Abstract

In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.

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Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
"How to Think Several Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action".Antonia Peacocke - 2019 - In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus, Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 31-60.
Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - 2020 - In Mark Timmons, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press.

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