Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods

Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263 (2009)
The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory.
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DOI 10.1177/1754073909103594
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Muk Yan Wong (2016). The Mood-Emotion Loop. Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3061-3080.
Daniel Silver (2011). The Moodiness of Action. Sociological Theory 29 (3):199 - 222.

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