Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods

Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263 (2009)
Abstract
The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory.
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DOI 10.1177/1754073909103594
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References found in this work BETA

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions.Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (1):29-50.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Intentional Stance.Daniel Dennett - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.

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