Contrastive empiricism

In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 392--410 (1990)
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Abstract

Realism and empiricism have always been contradictory tendencies in the philosophy of science. The view I will sketch is a synthesis, which I call Contrastive Empiricism. Realism and empiricism are incompatible, so a synthesis that merely conjoined them would be a contradiction. Rather, I propose to isolate important elements in each and show that they combine harmoniously. I will leave behind what I regard as confusions and excesses. The result, I hope, will be neither contradiction nor mishmash.

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Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
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