Authors
Florian Steinberger
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I argue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of rival logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible logic.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018, 2019
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,740
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals.Alexander W. Kocurek & Ethan J. Jerzak - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):673-704.
Another way logic might be normative.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):5861-5881.
Ought-Contextualism and Reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
Logical Pluralism and Logical Form.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 61 (241):25-42.
Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information.Patrick Allo - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-05-26

Total views
179 ( #61,346 of 2,462,869 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #28,395 of 2,462,869 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes