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Damian Szmuc [4]Damian Enrique Szmuc [1]
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Profile: Damian Szmuc (Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA))
  1.  32
    Theories of Truth Based on Four-Valued Infectious Logics.Damian Szmuc, Bruno Da Re & Federico Pailos - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    Infectious logics are systems which have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated (i) as a way to treat different pathological sentences (like the Liar and the Truth-Teller) differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps, and (ii) as a way to (...)
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  2.  13
    Conjunction and Disjunction in Infectious Logics.Hitoshi Omori & Damian Szmuc - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction: 6th International Workshop. Berlin: Springer. pp. 268-283.
    In this paper we discuss the extent to which conjunction and disjunction can be rightfully regarded as such, in the context of infectious logics. Infectious logics are peculiar many-valued logics whose underlying algebra has an absorbing or infectious element, which is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. To discuss these matters, we review the philosophical motivations for infectious logics due to Bochvar, Halldén, Fitting, Ferguson and Beall, noticing that none of them discusses (...)
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  3. A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition.Damian Szmuc - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.
    Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That (...)
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  4.  4
    A Paraconsistent Route to Semantic Closure.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Matias Pailos & Damian Enrique Szmuc - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):387-407.
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  5.  17
    On Pathological Truths.Damian Szmuc & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):601-617.
    In Kripke’s classic paper on truth it is argued that by adding a new semantic category different from truth and falsity it is possible to have a language with its own truth predicate. A substantial problem with this approach is that it lacks the expressive resources to characterize those sentences which fall under the new category. The main goal of this paper is to offer a refinement of Kripke’s approach in which this difficulty does not arise. We tackle this characterization (...)
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