The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):63-79 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. The author argues that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that so understood, it is not obscure. This kind of selective use of satisfaction semantics may be feasible in other contexts as a means of making theories more parsimonious.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-10

Downloads
545 (#41,235)

6 months
129 (#46,704)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Surovell
Texas State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Quantitative parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.
Steps toward a constructive nominalism.Nelson Goodman & Willard van Orman Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
Bradley’s Regress.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807.
I—Peter Simons: Relations and Truthmaking.Peter Simons - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):199-213.

View all 9 references / Add more references