Results for 'properties'

941 found
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  1. Toward a Practical Politics of Property-Owning Democracy: Program and Politics.Property-Owning Democracy - 2012 - In Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson (eds.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 223.
  2.  60
    Part One Property-Owning Democracy.Property-Owning Democracy - 2012 - In Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson (eds.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 15.
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  3. Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Drugs: An Ethical Analysis.of Intellectual Property - 2008 - In Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie & Denis Gordon Arnold (eds.), Ethical Theory and Business. New York: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
     
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  4. A New Modal Lindstrom Theorem.Finite Depth Property - 2006 - In Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53. pp. 55.
     
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  5.  16
    Democracy: Work, Gender, Political Economy.Interrogating Property-Owning - 2012 - In Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson (eds.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 147.
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  6. Understanding the object.Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic & Metaphysics in the Perception Chapter - 2019 - In Robert Brandom (ed.), A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s _phenomenology_. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
     
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  7.  35
    Simon Bostock.Property Realism - forthcoming - Metaphysica.
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  8. Public ai= I= airs quarterly.Private Property Rights - 2002 - Public Affairs Quarterly 16:231.
  9. The following classification is pragmatic and is intended merely to facilitate reference. No claim to exhaustive categorization is made by the parenthetical additions in small capitals.Psycholinguistics Semantics & Formal Properties Of Languages - 1974 - Foundations of Language: International Journal of Language and Philosophy 12:149.
  10. John Baden and Richard Stroup.Property Rights - forthcoming - Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics.
     
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  11.  14
    From Conflict to Confluence of Interest.Intellectual Property Rights - 2010 - In Thomas H. Murray & Josephine Johnston (eds.), Trust and integrity in biomedical research: the case of financial conflicts of interest. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  12. Maker theory?Propertied Objects as Truth-Makers - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher.
     
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  13. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
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  14. Non-qualitative Properties.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
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  15.  28
    ""Platonic Dualism, LP GERSON This paper analyzes the nature of Platonic dualism, the view that there are immaterial entities called" souls" and that every man is identical with one such entity. Two distinct arguments for dualism are discovered in the early and middle dialogues, metaphysical/epistemological and eth.Aaron Ben-Zeev Making Mental Properties More Natural - 1986 - The Monist 69 (3).
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  16. Roland N. Mckean.Some Changing Property Rights - forthcoming - Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics.
     
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  17. Disjunctive properties: Multiple realizations.Leonard J. Clapp - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):111-136.
  18. Properties and kinds of tropes: New linguistic facts and old philosophical insights.Friederike Moltmann - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):1-41.
    Terms such as 'wisdom' or 'happiness' are commonly held to refer to abstract objects that are properties. On the basis of a greater range of linguistic data and with the support of some ancient and medieval philosophical views, I argue that such terms do not stand for objects, but rather for kinds of tropes, entities that do not have the status of objects, but only play a role as semantic values of terms and as arguments of predicates. Such ‘non-objects’ (...)
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  19. (1 other version)Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property (...)
     
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  20. Properties, propositions and sets.Kit Fine - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):135 - 191.
  21. The Location of Properties.Nikk Effingham - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):846-866.
    This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible.
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  22. Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth.Colin Mcginn - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):404-406.
     
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  23. Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.Paul Audi - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized (...)
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  24.  43
    Properties Preserved under Definitional Equivalence and Interpretations.Charles C. Pinter - 1978 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 24 (31-36):481-488.
  25. Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  26. Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102.
    Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature.
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  27. Emergent properties and the context objection to reduction.Megan Delehanty - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):715-734.
    Reductionism is a central issue in the philosophy of biology. One common objection to reduction is that molecular explanation requires reference to higher-level properties, which I refer to as the context objection. I respond to this objection by arguing that a well-articulated notion of a mechanism and what I term mechanism extension enables one to accommodate the context-dependence of biological processes within a reductive explanation. The existence of emergent features in the context could be raised as an objection to (...)
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  28. Powerful Properties, Powerless Laws.Heather Demarest - 2017 - In Jonathan D. Jacobs (ed.), Causal Powers. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-53.
    I argue that the best scientific package is anti-Humean in its ontology, but Humean in its laws. This is because potencies and the best system account of laws complement each other surprisingly well. If there are potencies, then the BSA is the most plausible account of the laws of nature. Conversely, if the BSA is the correct theory of laws, then formulating the laws in terms of potencies rather than categorical properties avoids three serious objections: the mismatch objection, the (...)
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  29. Emergent properties.Timothy O'Connor - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):91-104.
    All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of (...)
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  30. Psychometric Properties and Measurement Invariance of the Brief Symptom Inventory-18 Among Chinese Insurance Employees.Mingshu Li, Meng-Cheng Wang, Yiyun Shou, Chuxian Zhong, Fen Ren, Xintong Zhang & Wendeng Yang - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  31. Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.
    Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that (...)
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  32.  39
    Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth.Scott A. Shalkowski - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):449-453.
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  33. Virtual properties: problems and prospects.Alexandre Declos - 2024 - Erkenntnis.
    According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual (...) can deal with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments. (shrink)
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  34. Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality.Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi & David Papineau - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (3):1-19.
    This paper aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research, the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have “essences”. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way (...)
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  35. Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to reject.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, (...)
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  36.  89
    Are Properties Particular, Universal, or Neither?Javier Cumpa - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):165-174.
    Are properties universal or particular? According to Universalism, properties are universals because there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the connections between the notions of the fundamental tie and (...)
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  37.  26
    Reasoning about local properties in modal logic.Wiebe van der Hoek, Hans van Ditmarsch & Barteld Kooi - unknown
    Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (2011). Reasoning about local properties in modal logic. In K. Tumer and P. Yolum and L. Sonenberg and P. Stone (editors). Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), pp. 711-718.
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  38. Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?David Liggins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10017-10037.
    In this paper I take second order-quantification to be a sui generis form of quantification, irreducible to first-order quantification, and I examine the implications of doing so for the debate over the existence of properties. Nicholas K. Jones has argued that adding sui generis second-order quantification to our ideology is enough to establish that properties exist. I argue that Jones does not settle the question of whether there are properties because—like other ontological questions—it is first-order. Then I (...)
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  39. Dispositional properties.A. D. Smith - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):439-445.
  40.  9
    Better-Making Properties and the Objectivity of Value Disagreement.Erich H. Rast - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):155-179.
    A light form of value realism is defended according to which objective properties of comparison objects make value comparisons true or false. If one object has such a better-making property and another lacks it, this is sufficient for the truth of a corresponding value comparison. However, better-making properties are only necessary and usually not sufficient parts of the justifications of value comparisons. The account is not reductionist; it remains consistent with error-theoretic positions and the view that there are (...)
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  41. On the need for properties: The road to pythagoreanism and back.C. B. Martin - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):193-231.
    The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well (...)
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  42.  43
    Ephemeral Properties and the Illusion of Microscopic Particles.Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (4):393-409.
    Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, we use conventional macroscopic objects as guiding examples to clarify the content of two important results of the beginning of twentieth century: Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen’s reality criterion and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. We then use them in combination to show that our widespread belief in the existence of microscopic particles is only the result of a cognitive illusion, as microscopic particles are not particles, but are instead the ephemeral spatial and local manifestations of (...)
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  43. Properties, causation, and projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker.Richard Swinburne - 1980 - In Laurence Jonathan Cohen & Mary Brenda Hesse (eds.), Applications of inductive logic: proceedings of a conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 313-20.
    SHOEMAKER IS WRONG TO CLAIM THAT ALL THE GENUINE PROPERTIES OF THINGS ARE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSAL POWERS OF THINGS. FOR THE ONLY GROUNDS FOR ATTRIBUTING CAUSAL POWERS TO THINGS ARE IN TERMS OF THE EFFECTS WHICH THOSE THINGS TYPICALLY PRODUCE. BUT ALL EFFECTS ARE ULTIMATELY INSTANTIATIONS OF PROPERTIES, AND IF THESE WERE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES TO PRODUCE EFFECTS, THERE WOULD BE A VICIOUS INFINITE REGRESS, AND NO ONE WOULD EVER BE JUSTIFIED IN ATTRIBUTING (...)
     
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  44. The biosemiotics of emergent properties in a pluralist ontology.Claus Emmeche - 1999 - In Edwina Taborsky (ed.), Semiosis, Evolution, Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign. Shaker Verlag.
    Published in: Edwina Taborsky, ed. (1999): Semiosis. Evolution. Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign. Shaker Verlag, Aachen. (pp. 89-108). The book is based on the meeting "Semiosis. Evolution. Energy, Third International Conference on Semiotics", Victoria Collage, University of Toronto, Canada, October 17-19, 1997 (programme and list of papers, see the SEE web page:http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see).
     
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  45.  21
    Jacek Pasnic/ck.Complex Properties Do We Need & Inour Ontology - 2006 - In J. Jadacki & J. Pasniczek (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation. Reidel. pp. 113.
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  46.  26
    Properties Exploring and Information Mining in Consumer Community Network: A Case of Huawei Pollen Club.Qingchun Meng, Zhen Zhang, Xiaole Wan & Xiaoxia Rong - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-19.
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  47. Searching for social properties.Dee Payton - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):741-754.
    What does it take for a property to be a social property? This question is different from questions about what it takes for a property to be socially constructed. That is: it is one thing to be social, it is another to be socially constructed. Compared to questions about social construction, this question about sociality has received relatively little attention in social metaphysics. Here, I work from a very specific set of observations which arise from the social metaphysics literature to (...)
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  48. Are moral properties impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.
    Perhaps the actual world does not contain moral properties. But might moral properties be impossible because no world, possible or actual, contains them? Two metaethical theories can be argued to entail just that conclusion; viz., emotivism and error theory. This paper works towards the strongest formulation of the emotivist argument for the impossibility of moral properties, but ultimately rejects it. It then uses the reason why the emotivist argument fails to argue that error-theoretic arguments for the impossibility (...)
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  49. The properties of mental causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' (...)
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  50.  82
    Properties, modalities, and God.Thomas V. Morris - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):35-55.
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