Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts

In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1791-99 (2013)

Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Abstract
Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
Keywords *Values  *Norms  *Thick Concepts
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,431
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva Jr - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.
The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics.Constantine Sandis - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:105-126.
The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Le pouvoir.Hichem Naar - 2018 - In Emma Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition d'Ithaque.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Thick Concepts and Underdetermination.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
How Are Thick Terms Evaluative?Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-20.
What Are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
Shapelessness and the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
Thinning the Thicket.Kenneth Shockley - 2012 - Environmental Ethics 34 (3):227-246.
Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts.Sunny Yang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.
From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms.Christine Tappolet - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 113--127.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-04-18

Total views
106 ( #90,385 of 2,374,854 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #559,821 of 2,374,854 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes