Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicates

Analysis 57 (3):209–210 (1997)
Abstract
In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in valid inferences. The question is why we should postulate truth predicates that do not satisfy this platitude.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00077
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Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
Simplifying Alethic Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.

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