Analysis 57 (3):209–210 (1997)

Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Abstract
In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in valid inferences. The question is why we should postulate truth predicates that do not satisfy this platitude.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00077
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Hindsight Bias is Not a Bias.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):43-52.
An account of truthmaking.Noël Blas Saenz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3413-3435.
Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.

View all 49 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
287 ( #37,167 of 2,505,992 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,037 of 2,505,992 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes