Pluralism about Truth

Edited by Cory Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
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  1. Pluralismo Alético.María Aparicio - 2009 - Ontology Studies: Cuadernos de Ontología:91-102.
    Through a connection between Nietzsche and Frege we defend the idea of an alethic pluralism. The leading thread is the question of the truth of a theory of truth; the answers we have to this question allow us to present a “hierarchical ordering” of the theories of truth. -/- Mediante el establecimiento de una conexión entre Nietzsche y Frege defendemos de la idea de un pluralismo a propósito del concepto de la verdad. El hilo conductor es la cuestión de la (...)
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  2. Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to (...)
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  3. Truth as One and Many.Murat Baç - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):122 – 125.
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  4. Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth.Brian Ball - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):116-135.
    In this paper, I outline and defend a novel approach to alethic pluralism, the thesis that truth has more than one metaphysical nature: where truth is, in part, explained by reference, it is relational in character and can be regarded as consisting in correspondence; but where instead truth does not depend upon reference it is not relational and involves only coherence. In the process, I articulate a clear sense in which truth may or may not depend upon reference: this involves (...)
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  5. The Synthetic Unity of Truth.Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 180.
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  6. Truth as Mediated Correspondence.Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
    We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.
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  7. Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW]Ricardo Barroso Batista - 2012 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 63 (3):573-576.
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  8. Deflated Truth Pluralism.J. C. Beall - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
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  9. On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  10. Deflationism, Pluralism, Expressivism, Pragmatism.Simon Blackburn - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 263.
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  11. Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism.Lajos L. Brons - 2015 - Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):129-148.
    In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
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  12. Is "Superassertible" a Truth Predicate?Anthony Brueckner - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):76-81.
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  13. Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW]Alexis Burgess - 2011 - Review of Metaphysics.
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  14. Three Dilemmas For Alethic Functionalism. [REVIEW]Stefano Caputo - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):853-861.
    According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation a coherent notion (...)
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  15. On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
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  16. Domains of Truth.William A. Christian - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):61 - 68.
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  17. Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity.John R. Cook - 2000 - Philosophy in Review 20 (2):121-123.
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  18. Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth, and Mixed Conjunctions.Roy T. Cook - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
    A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic (...)
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  19. Pluralism and Paradox.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - In Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 339.
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  20. Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
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  21. Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):473-479.
    Christine Tappolet posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry, or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties redundant. Douglas Edwards has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding the horns of Tappolet's dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated consequence of Edwards's view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show that Edwards's proposal fails to avoid Tappolet's original dilemma. His response is not successful, (...)
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  22. From Truth Pluralism to Ontological Pluralism and Back.Aaron J. Cotnoir & Douglas Edwards - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (3):113-140.
    Ontological pluralism holds that there are different ways of being. Truth pluralism holds that there are different ways of being true. Both views have received growing attention in recent literature, but so far there has been very little discussion of the connections between the views. The authors suggest that motivations typically given for truth pluralism have analogue motivations for ontological pluralism; they argue that while neither view entails the other, those who hold one view and wish to hold the other (...)
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  23. Linking Theory and Practice in Management Research: Scientific Research Programmes and Alethic Pluralism.John Darwin - 2004 - International Journal of Management Concepts and Philosophy 1 (1):43.
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  24. Lynch's Functionalist Theory of Truth.Marian David - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 42.
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  25. Truth as One and Many.Marian David - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743-746.
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  26. Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW]Marian David - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743-746.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011.
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  27. The Disunity of Truth.Josh Dever - unknown
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
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  28. Deflationism Trumps Pluralism!Julian Dodd - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 298.
  29. Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.
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  30. Naturalness, Representation, and the Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch.
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  31. Pluralist Theories of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  32. On Alethic Disjunctivism.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each of the domain-specific (...)
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  33. Alethic Vs Deflationary Functionalism.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):115-124.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 115-124, February 2012.
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  34. Simplifying Alethic Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination (...)
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  35. Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the truth property for moral discourse .Tappolet (...)
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  36. How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2008 - Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
    The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved.
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  37. Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  38. Review of Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
  39. Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 69.
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  40. Truth is One.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophia Scientiae 13 (1):1-12.
    This paper examines the “pluralist” conception of truth defended by Crispin Wright, and stresses its difficulties and its dangerous flirtation with relativsm. A solution to these difficulties, which Wright himself contemplates, consists in embracing a functionalist theory of truth, according to which truth is a kind of formal property “realised” differently in various domains. But this view, it is argued, does not get rid of the difficulties of pluralism. It is then argued that we have to accept that truth is (...)
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  41. Truth and Naturalism.Filippo Ferrari, Michael P. Lynch & Douglas Edwards - 2015 - In Kelly J. Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In (...)
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  42. Alethic Pluralism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Richard Fumerton - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
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  43. On Pluralism and Truth: A Critique of Michael P. Lynch’s Truth in Context.Gregory Ganssle - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):485-496.
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  44. Towards a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.Aaron M. Griffith - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1157-1173.
    This paper introduces a new approach to the theory of truthmaking. According to this approach, there are multiple forms of truthmaking. Here, I characterize and motivate a specific version of this approach, which I call a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.’ It is suggested that truthmaking is a plural, variegated phenomenon wherein different kinds of truths, e.g., positive truths, negative truths, counterfactual truths, etc., are made true in different ways. While the paper only aims to lay the groundwork for a Pluralist (...)
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  45. Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):98-100.
    Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically na{ï}ve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one (...)
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  46. The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths.Susan Haack - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):87-109.
    There is one truth, but many truths: i.e., one unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept, but many and various propositions that are true. One truth-concept: to say that a proposition is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, but) that things are as it says; but many truths: particular empirical claims, scientific theories, historical propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual interpretations, statements about what a person wants or believes or intends, about grammatical and legal rules, etc., etc. But, as (...)
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  47. Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW]Steven D. Hales - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):699-709.
  48. Review: Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW]Steven D. Hales - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):699 - 709.
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  49. Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Hendrik Hart - 2000 - Symposium 4 (1):143-145.
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  50. Wright's Truth and Objectivity.Terence Horgan - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1).
    In this critical study I first summarize Crispin Wright's "Truth and Objectivity". Wright maintains (1) that truth- aptness of a given discourse is neutral about questions of realism and anti- realism concerning the discourse, but also (2) that such metaphysical questions largely turn on discourse- specific constraints governing the truth- predicate. I urge a distinction between (i) Wright's general approach to truth and objectivity, and (ii) his apparent inclination to implement and the approach by construing truth as a fundamentally epistemic (...)
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