Pluralism about Truth

Edited by Cory Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
Assistant editor: Shawn Hernandez (California State University, Long Beach)
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  1. added 2020-03-23
    Alethic pluralism and the value of truth.Filippo Ferrari - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-14
    There is No Truth-Theory Like the Correspondence Theory.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - Discusiones Filosóficas 20 (34):15–41.
    I challenge the assumption that the pragmatist-, coherence-, identity- and deflationary theories of truth are essentially incompatible and rival views to the correspondence theory, without endorsing pluralism. With the exception of some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only appear to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are wedded to a rejection of an objective reality, or when it is assumed that a ‘theory of truth’ is a theory of the function of the truth-predicate. I argue (...)
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  3. added 2019-08-17
    Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism.Lionel Shapiro - forthcoming - In Stefan Brandt & Anke Breunig (eds.), Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 174–206.
    Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...)
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  4. added 2019-08-01
    Truth and Objectivity.R. M. Sainsbury - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899–904.
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  5. added 2019-07-10
    Methodological Pluralism About Truth.Nathan Kellen - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. pp. 131-144.
    In this paper I argue that contemporary truth pluralists have undersold the connection between their views and the semantic realism/anti-realism debate. I argue that pluralist theories of truth are essentially a combination of accepting both realist and anti-realist intuitions, and that we should take this lesson to heart. I show how we can categorize pluralist views by how realist or anti-realist they are, and introduce two notions to do so: methodological fundamentality and theoretical fundamentality. I show how viewing the pluralist (...)
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  6. added 2019-07-04
    True to Life: Why Truth Matters. [REVIEW]Kevin G. Rickert - 2005 - Review of Metaphysics 58 (4):903-904.
    The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, Lynch presents what he calls “truisms about truth.” The first truism is that truth is objective. Accepting a kind of Aristotelian realism, Lynch defines “true beliefs” as “those that portray the world as it is and not as we may hope, fear, or wish it to be”. The second truism is that truth is good. The point here is not that truth is morally good, but that it is generally (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-07
    Wright et la naturalisation de l’intentionnalité. Étude critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 pages. [REVIEW]Patrice Philie - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):417-429.
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Pluralisms in Truth and Logic.Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2018 - Palgrave Macmillan.
  9. added 2019-06-06
    Naturalness, Representation, and the Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    : This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Review: Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Max Kölbel - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):244-251.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
    The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Replies to Critics, (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Response to Commentators.Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):911-941.
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    On Pluralism and Truth A Critique of Michael P. Lynch’s Truth in Context.Gregory E. Ganssle - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):485–496.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    Precis of Truth and ObjectivityTruth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):863.
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  15. added 2019-05-29
    Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists.Andy Yu - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. London, UK: pp. 407-427.
    There have been few attempts to answer the challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. This chapter presents a pluralist account of logic and semantics that answers these challenges. The chapter also shows how to accommodate logical pluralism and ontological pluralism within an extension of the framework.
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  16. added 2019-03-27
    Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    The answers to the questions in the title depend on the kind of pluralism one is talking about. We will focus here on our own views. The purpose of this article is to trace out some possible connections between these kinds of pluralism. We show how each of them might bear on the other, depending on how certain open questions are resolved.
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  17. added 2019-03-19
    Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.
    The Metaphysics of Truth, by EdwardsDouglas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 208.
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  18. added 2019-03-18
    Review of Lenn E. Goodman, In Defense of Truth: A Pluralistic Approach. [REVIEW]David Putney - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):139-142.
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  19. added 2019-02-13
    Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed Functionalism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2018 - In Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. pp. 169-196.
    Functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism, is one of our most promising approaches to the study of truth. In this chapter, I chart a course for functionalist inquiry that centrally involves the empirical study of ordinary thought about truth. In doing so, I review some existing empirical data on the ways in which we think about truth and offer suggestions for future work on this issue. I also argue that some of our data lend support to two kinds of pluralism (...)
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  20. added 2019-02-06
    Pluralism and the Liar.Cory Wright - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press. pp. 347–373.
  21. added 2019-01-30
    Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth and Logic, by Gila Sher: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp Xviii + 370, £30. [REVIEW]Albert Atkin - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):838-838.
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  22. added 2019-01-15
    Postscript: Reply to McLeod.Lajos L. Brons - 2018 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill. pp. 364-370.
    This is my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015) paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist.
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  23. added 2018-11-05
    The Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? What role does truth play in the connections between language and the world? What is the relationship between truth and being? Douglas Edwards tackles these questions and develops a distinctive metaphysical worldview. He argues that in some domains language responds to the world, whereas in others language generates the world.
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  24. added 2018-11-05
    Verdad: Un Debate Tradicional Revisado.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 19 (2):265-301.
    “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed”. This paper proposes a critical review of the presuppositions at the background of the traditional discussion on truth. Despite acknowledging that the said discussion rationalizes many of the movements and tentatives of its main characters to clarify the facts, it isascertained that, since it is centered in a reductive analyses of truth, it is not apt to generate the most adequate interpretation of the same. The theories in dispute will be expounded and criticized: deflationism, intrinsicalism, (...)
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  25. added 2018-10-20
    Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.
    This paper re-examines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [ Fordoblelse ], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these (...)
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  26. added 2018-09-01
    Algebraic Semantics and Mixed Validities: A Reply to Cotnoir.Andrea Strollo - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.
    Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. Such a view has been challenged to make sense of the standard account of logical validity as necessary truth preservation. In this paper, the recent solution elaborated by Aaron Cotnoir, based on an algebraic approach, is shown to be untenable. Some reflections about the relation of many-valued logics with truth pluralism are also discussed.
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  27. added 2018-08-19
    Moralische Wahrheit als stabile gerechtfertigte Behauptbarkeit.Tatjana Tarkian - 2008 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (3):385-414.
    Crispin Wright hat vorgeschlagen, Superassertibilität – stabile oder dauerhafte gerechtfertigte Behauptbarkeit – als Wahrheitsprädikat für den moralischen Diskurs aufzufassen. Dieser Vorschlag wird hier aufgenommen, spezifiziert, auf Probleme hin untersucht und verteidigt. Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen ist dabei die Annahme, dass es attraktiv ist, in der Debatte um Grundlagenfragen der Ethik eine Position zu beziehen, die sich vom moralischen Realismus einerseits und andererseits vom Expressivismus, von einer Irrtumstheorie und vom moralischen Fiktionalismus unterscheidet. Für diese Richtungsentscheidung kann hier nicht befriedigend argumentiert werden; sie (...)
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  28. added 2018-08-19
    Truth, Warrant and Superassertibility.Paul Tomassi - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):31-56.
    In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright (1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s (...)
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  29. added 2018-08-19
    Truth and Superassertibility.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):1–19.
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  30. added 2018-08-19
    Superassertibility and Asymptotic Truth.Jason Holt - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (1):109-122.
    RÉSUMÉ: Une partie des raisons invoquées par Wright en faveur de sa théorie «neutre» de la vérité tiennent à ce qu'il considère comme déficiente à plusieurs égards une approche apparentée proposée par Putnam. Je soutiens ici que ces déficiences affectent soit les deux doctrines, soit ni l'une ni l'autre, mais que celle de Wright est néanmoins supérieure. À mettre ensemble l'explication du prédicat de vérité offerte par Putnam et l'extension qu'il entend lui attribuer, on se heurte en effet à un (...)
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  31. added 2018-08-19
    Truth and Superassertibility.J. L. Kvanvig - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):1-19.
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  32. added 2018-08-19
    Superassertibility and Asymptotic Truth.Jason Holt - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (1):109-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Une partie des raisons invoquées par Wright en faveur de sa théorie «neutre» de la vérité tiennent à ce qu'il considère comme déficiente à plusieurs égards une approche apparentée proposée par Putnam. Je soutiens ici que ces déficiences affectent soit les deux doctrines, soit ni l'une ni l'autre, mais que celle de Wright est néanmoins supérieure. À mettre ensemble l'explication du prédicat de vérité offerte par Putnam et l'extension qu'il entend lui attribuer, on se heurte en effet à un (...)
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  33. added 2018-08-18
    Semantic-Truth Approaches in Chinese Philosophy: A Unifying Pluralist Account.Bo Mou - 2018 - Lexington Books.
    The work explains a unifying pluralist account of truth that combines representative truth-concern approaches in Chinese philosophy to posit one foundation of the various movements of thought in Chinese philosophy that pursue “how things are.” Mou contributes a unique, Eastern view to contemporary exploration of the philosophical issue of truth.
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  34. added 2018-08-18
    On the Analogy Between Cognitive Representation and Truth.Mauricio Suárez & Albert Solé - 2006 - Theoria 21 (1):39-48.
    In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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  35. added 2018-07-14
    Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth Beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether (...)
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  36. added 2018-07-08
    Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):31-74.
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  37. added 2018-07-02
    Deflating Truth About Taste.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4).
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...)
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  38. added 2018-06-25
    Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
    ABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as (...)
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  39. added 2018-06-09
    Putnam’s Conception of Truth.Massimo Dell'Utri - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2):5-22.
    After stressing how the attempt to provide a plausible account of the connection between language and the world was one of Putnam’s constant preoccupations, this article describes the four stages his thinking about the concepts of truth and reality went through. Particular attention is paid to the kinds of problems that made him abandon each stage to enter the next. The analysis highlights how all the stages but one express a general non-epistemic stance towards truth and reality—the right stance, according (...)
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  40. added 2018-06-08
    Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.
    Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what (...)
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  41. added 2018-06-06
    Précis to True to Life, and Replies to Commentators.Michael Lynch - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46:289-91.
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  42. added 2018-05-05
    Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.Jonathan Kvanvig - unknown
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
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  43. added 2018-05-05
    Review of Wright & Pedersen (Eds.), New Waves in Truth. [REVIEW]Andreas Stokke - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  44. added 2018-05-05
    On Wright’s Inductive Definition of Coherence Truth for Arithmetic.Jeffrey Ketland - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):6-15.
    In “Truth – A Traditional Debate Reviewed”, Crispin Wright proposed an inductive definition of “coherence truth” for arithmetic relative to an arithmetic base theory B. Wright’s definition is in fact a notational variant of the usual Tarskian inductive definition, except for the basis clause for atomic sentences. This paper provides a model-theoretic characterization of the resulting sets of sentences "cohering" with a given base theory B. These sets are denoted WB. Roughly, if B satisfies a certain minimal condition, then WB (...)
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  45. added 2018-05-05
    Realism and Truth: A Comment on Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity.Philip Pettit - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
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  46. added 2018-03-21
    Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic, by Gila Sher.Terry Horgan - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):881-890.
    © Mind Association 2018Gila Sher’s Epistemic Friction is a bold and ambitious book, with many interesting things to say not only about knowledge, truth, and logic but also about matters ontological. It often requires the reader to construe it hermeneutically, but repays the effort of doing so.She coins the expression ‘epistemic friction’ to refer to constraints on a system of knowledge, coming from both the world and the mind. She says, ‘The world as the object or target of our theories (...)
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  47. added 2018-03-21
    Gila Sher. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Julian C. Cole - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (1):136-148.
    © The Authors [2017]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.comGila Sher believes that our basic epistemic situation — that we aim to gain knowledge of a highly complex world using our severely limited, yet highly resourceful, cognitive capacities — demands that all epistemic projects be undertaken within two broad constraints: epistemic freedom and epistemic friction. The former permits us to employ our cognitive resourcefulness fully while undertaking epistemic projects, while the latter requires that (...)
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  48. added 2018-02-26
    Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-17
    New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What is truth? Philosophers are interested in a range of issues involving the concept of truth beginning with what sorts of things can be true. This is a collection of eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today.
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  50. added 2018-02-17
    How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):143-149.
    The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved.
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