Sense-only-signs: Frege on fictional proper names

Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):375-400 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I explore Frege's thesis that fictional proper names are supposed to have only sense and no reference. How can one make this thesis compatible with Frege's view that sense determines reference? By holding that fictional proper names are introduced in a particular kind of speech act. Or so I argue.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,590

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Frege and the Description Theory: An Attempt at Rehabilitation.Ari Maunu - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):109-116.
Frege's equivalence thesis and reference failure.Nathan Hawkins - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (1):198-222.
Frege, fiction and force.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3669-3692.
Frege's Answer to Kripke.Tapio Korte - 2021 - Theoria 88 (2):464-479.
A note on Frege on sense.V. H. Dudman - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):119 – 122.
Fictional Objects.Gerald Vision - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):45-59.
Fictional Objects.Gerald Vision - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):45-59.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-25

Downloads
99 (#55,386)

6 months
11 (#1,140,922)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Textor
King's College London

Citations of this work

Frege, fiction and force.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3669-3692.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references