Substance and Its Attributes in Spinoza and Reality and Idea in F.H. Bradley

Bradley Studies 4 (2):145-157 (1998)

In the summer of 1893, following the first publication of F.H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, Edward Caird and Sir Henry Jones exchanged letters, with Caird bringing criticism to bear on Bradley’s work analogous to one of Hegel’s objections to Spinoza’s theory of the attributes of substance. Spinoza’s attributes of his one reality, or substance — i.e., extension and thought and infinitely many other attributes not directly known to us — each contain this reality, and they are each a way for us to know it. Hegel objected that they each failed in this owing to the abstractness of Spinoza’s ideas of the attributes. Caird held that Bradley’s metaphysics also makes the idea of reality in this way opposed to its object. The idea fails to contain reality as concrete experience.
Keywords Major Philosophers
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ISBN(s) 1362-0916
DOI 10.5840/bradley19984212
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