Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion

Mind 108 (432):705-25 (1999)
Authors
Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
Keywords Cognition  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Phenomenalism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/108.432.705
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The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
The Phenomenal Stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.

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