Adam Smith and David Hume: with Sympathy*: F. L. van Holthoon

Utilitas 5 (1):35-48 (1993)
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Abstract

Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature.

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Citations of this work

Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory.Paul Sagar - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):681-705.
Oh, the Humanity: Deflating a Humean Concept.Aaron Szymkowiak - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):197-217.
It is Possible Morality Based on Sympathy?Juan Carlos Suárez Villegas - 2011 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 10 (1):85–96.

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References found in this work

The Life of David Hume.Ernest Campbell Mossner - 1956 - Philosophy 31 (116):80-82.
David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist and Sceptical Metaphysician.Annette Baier - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):127-131.
Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.David R. Raynor - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1):51-79.

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