Goals are not implied by actions, but inferred from actions and contexts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):38-39 (2008)

Iris van Rooij
Radboud University Nijmegen
People cannot understand intentions behind observed actions by direct simulation, because goal inference is highly context dependent. Context dependency is a major source of computational intractability in traditional information-processing models. An embodied embedded view of cognition may be able to overcome this problem, but then the problem needs recognition and explication within the context of the new, layered cognitive architecture
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X07003305
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References found in this work BETA

Coherence in Thought and Action (M. Amini).P. Thagard - 2000 - Philosophical Books 43 (2):136-140.
A Non-Representational Approach to Imagined Action.I. van Rooij - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (3):345-375.

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What Do Mirror Neurons Mirror?Sebo Uithol, Iris van Rooij, Harold Bekkering & Pim Haselager - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):607 - 623.

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