Responsibility in a World of Causes
Philosophic Exchange 40 (1):56-78 (2010)
AbstractThere is a familiar chain of reasoning that goes something like this: if everything is caused, no one is free, and thus, no one can be morally responsible. Reasoning like this has made scientific explanations of human behavior (e.g., biology, psychology, and neuroscience) threatening to familiar ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and merit. Rather than directly attacking the chain of reasoning that gives rise to these worries, I explore an alternative approach, one that begins by considering the "use" of moral responsibility. What role does the concept play for us? What structure, if any, would an ideal set of practices and attitudes about moral responsibility have to it? I outline a new account of responsibility and consider what it might mean for traditional worries about causal, scientific explanations of human behavior.
Similar books and articles
The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.
Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.
Unwitting Behavior and Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (1):139-152.
On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.
A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
About the Needlessness of the Verb “To Be”.Dan Simbotin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:231-236.
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.) - 1993 - Cornell University Press.
Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. New York: Oxford UP.
An Analysis of Semi-Compatibilism.Gan Hun Ahn - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:7-12.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
7 Free Will Is Un-natural.John A. Bargh - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 128.