British Journal of Psychology 90 (4):543-566 (1999)

Authors
Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London
Abstract
The study of preconscious versus conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by "conscious processing." Current evidence suggests that perception becomes conscious at a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with information integration and dissemination. Reliable criteria for determining when perception becomes conscious combine the evidence of "first-person," phenomenological reports with "third-person" functional dissociations between preconscious and conscious processing. There are three, distinct senses in which a process may be said to be "conscious." It might be "conscious" (a) in the sense that one is conscious of the process, (b) in the sense that the operation of the process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and (c) in the sense that consciousness enters into or causally influences the process. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than entering into input analysis, appears to follow it, in human information processing. Processes closely associated with the appearance of consciousness such as information integration and dissemination appear to operate unconsciously. Consequently, perception appears to be "conscious" only in sense (b)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,489
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intentionality, Conceptual Content, and Emotions.Léo Peruzzo Júnior - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).
The Emergence of Emotions.Richard Sieb - 2013 - Activitas Nervosa Superior 55 (4):115-145.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Time, Action, and Consciousness.Axel Cleeremans - 2006 - Human Movement Science.
Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion.Max Velmans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument.Carolyn Suchy-Dicey - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
Essential Issues of Conscious Machines.Pentti O. A. Haikonen - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):72-84.
Preconscious Free Will.Max Velmans - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control.John Dilworth - 2008 - Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
A Process Oriented View of Conscious Perception.Riccardo Manzotti - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):7-41.
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
71 ( #163,883 of 2,520,786 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,623 of 2,520,786 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes