Objects as Intentional and as Real

Abstract
A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves to be called "rear". Qua possible object, it answers to a principle of individuation which also works as a criterion of discrimination. According to such a principle, any possible object has a counterfactual individualising property which takes substance plus origin in a given spacetime as the object's essential properties, where it exists. It is, moreover, an object of discourse insofar as it generically depends, for its own being, on a singular term being publicly used to refer to it
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps19914140
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Citations of this work BETA
Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
Guises and Their Existence.Alberto Voltolini - 1996 - Axiomathes 7 (3):419-434.
Is It Merely Loose Talk?⋆.Alberto Voltolini - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (1):51-72.

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