Conditionals, Modals, and Hypothetical Syllogism

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):90-97 (2014)
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Abstract

Moti Mizrahi (2013) presents some novel counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) for indicative conditionals. I show that they are not compelling as they neglect the complicated ways in which conditionals and modals interact. I then briefly outline why HS should nevertheless be rejected

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Lee Walters
University of Southampton

References found in this work

Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Subjunctive reasoning.John Pollock - 1976 - Reidel. Edited by Lloyd Humberstone.
On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.

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