Ethics 132 (2):445-477 (2022)

Hayden Wilkinson
Oxford University
Which is better: a guarantee of a modest amount of moral value, or a tiny probability of arbitrarily large value? To prefer the latter seems fanatical. But, as I argue, avoiding such fanaticism brings severe problems. To do so, we must decline intuitively attractive trade-offs; rank structurally identical pairs of lotteries inconsistently, or else admit absurd sensitivity to tiny probability differences; have rankings depend on remote, unaffected events ; and often neglect to rank lotteries as we already know we would if we learned more. Compared to these implications, fanaticism is highly plausible.
Keywords Decision theory  Fanaticism  Expected utility theory  Small probabilities  Totalism  Risk aversion
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Reprint years 2021, 2022
DOI 10.1086/716869
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Infinite Aggregation.Hayden Wilkinson - 2021 - Dissertation, Australian National University

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Citations of this work BETA

Infinite Aggregation.Hayden Wilkinson - 2021 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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