Synthese 193 (6) (2016)

Authors
Jack Woods
University of Canterbury
Abstract
I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be the most natural minimal way of distinguishing content and form and suggest further problems arising for this route.
Keywords Cut/transitivity  Restall  Assertion/denial  Logical form  Logical consequence
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Reprint years 2016
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0797-y
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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