Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344 (2011)
The Dutch Book Argument shows that an agent will lose surely in a gamble if his degrees of belief do not satisfy the laws of the probability. Yet a question arises here: What does the Dutch Book imply? This paper firstly argues that there exists a utility function following Ramsey’s axioms. And then, it explicates the properties of the utility function and degree of belief respectively. The properties show that coherence in partial beliefs for Subjective Bayesianism means that the degree of belief, representing a belief ordering, satisfies the laws of probability, and that coherence in preferences means that the preferences are represented by expected utilities. A coherent belief ordering and a utility scale induce a coherent preference ordering; a coherent preference ordering induces a coherent belief ordering which can be uniquely represented by a degree-of-belief function. The preferences and beliefs are both incoherent or disordered if a Dutch Book is made.
|Keywords||Dutch Book coherence degree of belief decision making|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic.Ian Hacking - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
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