Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219 (2015)

Authors
Eric Yang
Santa Clara University
Abstract
Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out her case for incompatibility, I present an account of substance—one that relies on a relational ontology—that makes the combination of substance materialism and property dualism unproblematic. Then I show that even under the theories of substance that Schneider considers—those that rely on a constituent ontology—there still is no incompatibility problem
Keywords Property dualism  Substance materialism  Ontology  Animalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0465-6
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References found in this work BETA

Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Relational Vs. Constituent Ontologies.Peter van Inwagen - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):389-405.

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Citations of this work BETA

Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.

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