Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality

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10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9

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Susan Schneider
Florida Atlantic University

Citations of this work

Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Material through and through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.
Must strong emergence collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):49--104.
Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux.Hane Htut Maung - 2019 - Synthesis Philosophica 34 (1):157-172.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
An essay concerning human understanding.John Locke - 1689 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Pauline Phemister.
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.

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