Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76 (2012)
Abstract
I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality
Keywords Property dualism  David Chalmers  Jaegwon Kim  Qualia  Substance dualism  Substance  Mind  Non-reductive physicalism  Consciousness  Bundle theory  Substratum theory  Physicalism  Materialism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9
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References found in this work BETA
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1700 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219.
Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.

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