Brueckner and Fischer on the Evil of Death
Philosophia 40 (2):295-303 (2012)
Abstract
A primary argument against the badness of death (known as the Symmetry Argument) appeals to an alleged symmetry between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. The Symmetry Argument has posed a serious threat to those who hold that death is bad because it deprives us of life’s goods that would have been available had we died later. Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer develop an influential strategy to cope with the Symmetry Argument. In their attempt to break the symmetry, they claim that due to our preference of future experiential goods over past ones, posthumous nonexistence is bad for us, whereas prenatal nonexistence is not. Granting their presumption about our preference, however, it is questionable that prenatal nonexistence is not bad. This consideration does not necessarily indicate their defeat against the Symmetry Argument. I present a better response to the Symmetry Argument: the symmetry is broken, not because posthumous nonexistence is bad while prenatal nonexistence is not, but because (regardless as to whether prenatal nonexistence is bad) posthumous nonexistence is even worseAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11406-011-9328-3
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Citations of this work
The Symmetry Argument Against the Deprivation Account.Huiyuhl Yi - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):947-959.
The Evil of Death: A Reply to Yi.John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):741-748.
New Reflections on the Mirror: the Interests Proximity Bias Solution.Ricardo Miguel & Diogo Santos - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1527-1542.
The Temporal Bias Approach to the Symmetry Problem and Historical Closeness.Huiyuhl Yi - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.
References found in this work
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death.Fred Feldman - 1992 - Oxford University Press.