Related categories

307 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 307
  1. Teleology, Narrative, and Death.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - In John Lippitt & Patrick Stokes (eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 29-45.
    Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, has recently been claimed as a narrativist about selves. From this Heideggerian perspective, we can see how narrative expands upon the psychological view, adding a vital teleological dimension to the understanding of selfhood while denying the reductionism implicit in the psychological approach. Yet the narrative approach also inherits the neo-Lockean emphasis on the past as determining identity, whereas the self is fundamentally about the future. Death is crucial on this picture, not as allowing for the possibility of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Is the Fear of Death Irrational?Colin Amery - 2003 - Philosophy Pathways 57.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Lucretius and the Fears of Death.Peter Aronoff - 1997 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The Epicureans argued that death was nothing to us and that we should not fear death, and this thesis takes up these arguments as they appear in our fullest extant source, the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius. After an initial look at the general Epicurean theory of emotions, the thesis narrows in on the fears of death. Lucretius starts from a popular dichotomy concerning death: death is either the utter destruction of the person who dies, or the person survives in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. 4. Intimations of Deprivation.Athanasiadis Harris - 2001 - In Harris Athanasiadis (ed.), George Grant and the Theology of the Cross: The Christian Foundations of His Thought. University of Toronto Press. pp. 121-180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death.Emily A. Austin - 2012 - Apeiron 45 (2):109-129.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. The Expectation of Nothingness.James Baillie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-203.
    While all psychologically competent persons know that they will one day die, this knowledge is typically held at a distance, not fully assimilated. That is, while we do not doubt that we will die, there is another sense in which we cannot fully believe it either. However, on some rare occasions, we can grasp the reality of our mortal nature in a way that is seemingly revelatory, as if the fact is appreciated in a new way. Thomas Nagel calls this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. When Death Enters Life.John Baum - 2003 - Floris.
  8. The Denial of Death.Ernest Becker - 1973 - New York: Free Press.
    Drawing from religion and the human sciences, particularly psychology after Freud, the author attempts to demonstrate that the fear of death is man's central ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   97 citations  
  9. Learning to Be Dead: The Narrative Problem of Mortality.Kathy Behrendt - 2016 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. pp. 157-172.
    The problem of mortality treats death as posing a paradox for the narrative view of the self. This view, on some interpretations, needs death in order to complete a life in a manner analogous to the ending of a story. But death is inaccessible to the subject herself, and so the analogy fails. Our inability to grasp the event of our own death is thought to undermine the possibility of achieving a meaningful, coherent, or complete life on narrativist terms. Narrativist (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. The Senses of and Ending.Kathy Behrendt - 2015 - In Patrick Stokes (ed.), Narrative, Identity, and the Kierkegaardian Self. pp. 186-202.
    Many philosophical discussions of the narrative self touch upon the end of life. End-related terms and concepts that occur in these discussions include finitude, completion, closure, telos, retroactive meaning-conferral, life shape, and a closed beginning-middle-and-end structure. Those who emphasise life’s end in non-philosophical narrative contexts are perhaps clearer on its significance. The end is thought to play a key role in the story of a life, securing or enhancing the life narrative’s meaning or value, and thereby warranting special treatment and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Whole Lives and Good Deaths.Kathy Behrendt - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):331-347.
    This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die.Kathy Behrendt - 2011 - Think 10 (28):67-76.
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. A Special Way of Being Afraid.Kathy Behrendt - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):669-682.
    I am interested in fear of non-existence, which is often discussed in terms of fear one’s own death, or as it is sometimes called, fear of death as such. This form of fear has been denied by some philosophers. Cognitive theories of the emotions have particular trouble in dealing with it, granting it a status that is simultaneously paradigmatic yet anomalous with respect to fear in general. My paper documents these matters, and considers a number of responses. I provide examples (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative.Kathy Behrendt - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Posthumous Harm: Why the Dead Are Still Vulnerable.Raymond Angelo Belliotti - 2011 - Lexington Books.
    After introducing the early work of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Kant on the matter, this book critically examines the literature over the past four decades on the topic of posthumous harm.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Harm, Change, and Time.C. Belshaw - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):425-444.
    What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does bring (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. By James Stacey Taylor. (London: Routledge, 2012. Pp. 228. Price £80.00 Hb. Also Available as an eBook.). [REVIEW]Christopher Belshaw - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):621-624.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Mortal Beings: On the Metaphysics and Value of Death – Jens Johansson.Christopher Belshaw - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):506–508.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. There's No Method in the Badness.David Benatar - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (3):174-174.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Effect of Maintenance Schedule on the Relationship Between Alley Speeds and Preexperimental Deprivation Periods.Robert L. Benefield & David Ehrenfreund - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (5):293-294.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. The Death of Lucius Equitius on 10 December 100 B.C.J. Lea Beness & T. W. Hillard - 1990 - Classical Quarterly 40 (01):269-.
    The picture of L. Appuleius Saturninus' last days is usually derived from the straightforward narrative account found in Appian's Civil Wars, an account which modern analysis has shown to be flawed. That narrative may be glossed as follows. At the consular elections for the year 99, Saturninus and Glaucia instigated the death of a more hopeful contender. Chaos followed. On the following day, when the People had made its intention to do away with the ‘malefactors’ absolutely plain, Saturninus, Glaucia and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Death.Boran Bercic - 2004 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 94 (24:3-4):861-882.
    In this article the author critically examines well-known arguments which purport to show that death is not something bad for the person who dies, and tries to show that these arguments are not sound, that is, the author tries to show that death really is something bad for person who died. The author believes that Williams did not show that eternal life would be unbearable and that death after sufficiently long life would be a relief. Furthermore, famous Epicurus ' argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. On the Relative Value of Human and Animal Lives.Mark Bernstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1517-1538.
    It has become virtually a matter of dogma—among both philosophers and laypersons—that human lives are more valuable than animal lives. One argument for this claim dominates the philosophical literature and, despite its employment by a host of philosophers, should be found wanting. I try to show that this line of reasoning, as well as one that is less popular but still with significant appeal, are faulty. The errors in each argument seem fatal: the pervasive argument begs the question, and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Alley Length and Time of Food Deprivation in Instrumental Reward Learning.Norma Fredenburg Besch & William F. Reynolds - 1958 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 56 (5):448.
  25. Death and Well-Being.John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  26. Mortal Harm and the Antemortem Experience of Death.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):640-42.
    In his recent book, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics (Routeledge 2012), James Stacey Taylor challenges two ideas whose provenance may be traced all the way back to Aristotle. The first of these is the thought that death (typically) harms the one who dies (mortal harm thesis). The second is the idea that one can be harmed (and wronged) by events that occur after one’s death (posthumous harm thesis). Taylor devotes two-thirds of the book to arguing against both theses and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Death's Distinctive Harm.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.
    Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. In Defence of Euthanasia: The Epicurean View of Death.Andreas J. M. Blom - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    Epicuras holds that death should not be feared, as it cannot be experienced. This thesis defends that view. ;If all sensation ceases when the body dies, one's own non-existence cannot possibly be experienced. If, as is argued, good and bad cannot be inherent qualities, death cannot be inherently bad. It follows that one need not fear one's own non-existence. ;Acceptance of this view may not affect our fear of death, but it implies that if we encounter a person who has (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Gunmen and Ice Cream Cones: Harm to Autonomy and Harm to Persons.J. S. Blumenthal-Barby & Peter A. Ubel - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics 16 (11):13-14.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. The Posthumous Papers.John Elof Boodin - 1957 - [Los Angeles]University of California.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Immortality Without Boredom.Lisa Bortolotti & Yujin Nagasawa - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):261-277.
    In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. Understanding Harm.Charles Bosk - 2000 - Hastings Center Report 30 (4):44-45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Epicureanism, Death, and the Good Life.Glenn Braddock - 2000 - Philosophical Inquiry 22 (1-2):47-66.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. Eternalism and Death's Badness Syracuse University.Ben Bradley - unknown
    Suppose that at the moment of death, a person goes out of existence.1 This has been thought to pose a problem for the idea that death is bad for its victim. But what exactly is the problem? Harry Silverstein says the problem stems from the truth of the “Values Connect with Feelings” thesis (VCF), according to which it must be possible for someone to have feelings about a thing in order for that thing to be bad for that person (2000, (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. How Should We Feel About Death?Ben Bradley - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (1):1-14.
    This paper examines the implications of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals for the correctness of emotions and attitudes towards death. I argue that the correctness of an attitude such as fear must be explained by appeal to its causal relations to certain preferences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36. Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
  37. The Worst Time to Die.Ben Bradley - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):291-314.
    At what stage of life is death worst for its victim? I hold that, typically, death is worse the earlier it occurs. Others, including Jeff McMahan and Christopher Belshaw, have argued that it is worst to die in early adulthood. In this paper I show that McMahan and Belshaw are wrong; I show that views that entail that Student’s death is worse face fatal objections. I focus in particular on McMahan’s time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the badness of death. Manuscript (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. How Bad is Death?Ben Bradley - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
    A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues that a deprivation account should discount the evil of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?Ben Bradley - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  40. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death.Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Whole-Life Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  42. Is Death's Badness Gendered? Symposium on Christine Overall's Book Aging, Death and Human Longevity: A Philosophical Inquiry.Samantha Brennan - unknown
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Is Death's Badness Gendered?Samantha Brennan - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):559-566.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. The Badness of Death, the Wrongness of Killing, and the Moral Importance of Autonomy.Samantha Brennan - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):723.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Death's Badness.Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):37-45.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  46. Why is Death Bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  47. Being Born Earlier.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):110 – 114.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  48. The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  49. Epicurus, Death, and the Wrongness of Killing.Mikel Burley - 2010 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-86.
    This article questions the assumption, held by several philosophers, that the Epicurean argument for death's being ?nothing to us? must be fallacious since its acceptance would undermine the principle that killing is (in general) wrong. Two possible strategies are considered, which the Epicurean-sympathizer might deploy in order to show that the non-badness of death (for the person who dies) is compatible with killing's being wrong. One of these is unsuccessful; the other is more promising. It involves arguing that the wrongness (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death.Mikel Burley - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.
    In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 307