Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Introduction to Debates on Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):431-448.
Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.
The contextual stance.Gordon R. Foxall - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
Reading mother nature's mind.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
Cognition, natural selection and the intentional stance.Daisie Radner & Michael Radner - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.
Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
A Critique of Embodied Simulation.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):579-599.
What is so special about embodied simulation?Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):512-519.
Is social cognition embodied?Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):154-159.
Embodied cognition and mindreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-10

Downloads
102 (#171,244)

6 months
10 (#269,579)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?