Elga : 1–10, 2010) has argued that, even when no particular subjective probability is required by one’s evidence, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective probabilities. Otherwise, they would be rationally permitted to knowingly turn down some sure gains. I argue that it is likewise true that, even when we do not possess enough practical reasons for a sharp evaluation, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective values. Those who would be most inclined to reject this argument are those who (...) claim that we are rationally required by either our beliefs that objective values are unsharp or by our own ‘real’ values to have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the former claim, I show that we need not believe that all objective values are sharp to rationally have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the latter claim, I conclude that sharpened subjective values must be ‘real’ because otherwise perfect rationality would be impossible in principle. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that the doctrines of classical Greek philosophers and scientists were transformed by commentators of, roughly, the second to sixth centuries AD. It is, however, less clear how these transformations precisely took place. This article contributes to the discussion by exploring explanative practices in ancient Greek commentaries on authors such as the Hippocratic Corpus, Aristotle, and Euclid and by arguing that among the practices concerned there was a tendency to blur the distinction of nature and text. Among (...) the commentators discussed are Apollonius of Citium, Galen, Proclus, Pappus, Palladius, Simplicius, and Eutocius. Disciplines concerned are mathematics, medicine and natural philosophy. Having distinguished ontological and pragmatic approaches to explanation, I provide an overview of exegetical practices in commentaries which deal with natural phenomena through authoritative texts. The second part of the paper discusses the commentator’s problem of how to decide where to stop explaining or how to select the problems that deserve explanation. The last part analyzes the habit of many commentators to turn perceived gaps into stories. I conclude by returning to the communicative functions of the explanations discussed. It turns out that they, to differing degrees, all contain self-referential aspects that serve to enhance the commentator’s position within his field. (shrink)