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    Chaos and Indeterminism.Jesse Hobbs - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):141 - 164.
    Laplacean determinism remains a popular theory among philosophers and scientists alike, in spite of the fact that the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, with which it is inconsistent, has been around for more than fifty years. There are a number of reasons for its continuing popularity. One, recently articulated by Honderich, is that there are too many possible interpretations of quantum mechanics, and the subject is too controversial even among physicists to be an adequate basis for overturning determinism. Nevertheless, quantum (...)
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  2.  45
    Ex Post Facto Explanations.Jesse Hobbs - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):117-136.
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  3.  99
    Inference to the Best Explanation. Peter Lipton.Jesse Hobbs - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):679-680.
  4.  65
    A Limited Defense of the Pessimistic Induction.Jesse Hobbs - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):171-191.
    The inductive argument from the falsity of most past scientific theories (more than 100 years old) to the falsity of most present ones is defensible, I argue, if it is modified to account for the degrees of theoreticity or observationality in such theories, and the extent to which they are hedged. The case of descriptive astronomy is examined to show that most of the true theories of the 1890s were high in observationality and/or significantly hedged. The false theories of that (...)
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  5. Religious Explanation and Scientific Ideology.Jesse Hobbs - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (3):175-177.
    Can religious premises ever be cited legitimately in explanations of matters of fact? Scientific practice is generally regarded as the source of our explanatory paradigms and the final arbiter of matters of fact, and is so constituted that it could never endorse such explanations. Neither would they be sanctioned by the non-cognitive reconstructions of religious discourse currently fashionable. I argue: Some scientific constraints on explanations, such as consistency, testability, and corrigibility, are generally legitimate in non-scientific contexts. Other cognitive values, such (...)
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